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Abstract—Wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising
technology to prolong the lifetime of sensor and communication
devices, i.e., workers, in completing crowdsourcing tasks by
providing continuous and cost-effective energy supplies. In this
paper, we propose a wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing
(SC) framework which consists of two mutual dependent phases:
task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing phase. In the
task allocation phase, we propose a Stackelberg game based
mechanism for the SC platform to efficiently allocate spatial
tasks and wireless charging power to each worker. In the
data crowdsourcing phase, the workers may have an incentive
to misreport its real working location to improve its own
utility, which manipulates the SC platform. To address this
issue, we present a strategyproof deployment mechanism for the
SC platform to deploy its mobile base station. We apply the
Moulin’s generalized median mechanism and analyze the worst-
case performance in maximizing the SC platform’s utility. Finally,
numerical experiments reveal the effectiveness of the proposed
framework in allocating tasks and charging power to workers
while avoiding the dishonest worker’s manipulation.
Index Terms—Spatial crowdsourcing, facility location, mecha-
nism design, wireless power transfer
I. INTRODUCTION
Integrated with advanced sensing and communication tech-
niques, mobile devices can help complete diverse location-
aware tasks, such as large-scale data acquisition and analysis
of real-time traffic monitoring or weather measurements at
different places. By focusing on the geospatial data, a new
paradigm called spatial crowdsourcing (SC) [1] has received
increasing attention in the last few years [2], [3]. Typically,
there are three entities in the SC system, including an online
SC platform, requesters and workers. As a core component
of the SC system, the SC platform serves as a broker which
allows requesters to post tasks and recruits workers to com-
plete them. Each employed worker then stays at or travels to
its target task area to collect and transmit the requested data
back. We hence study the interactions between the SC platform
and the workers.
Most existing work assumes that there is always a reliable
communication infrastructure and enough energy available for
workers to complete the data transmission. However, this may
not be realistic especially when workers have to perform tasks
in remote areas without a wireless base station deployed.
Moreover, the workers can be battery-powered wireless mobile
devices. Fortunately, studies [4], [5] in wireless powered sen-
sor networks have illustrated the feasibility of using wireless
power transfer (WPT) [6] in sensing data collection to prolong
the lifetime of sensors. In view of this, we consider a paradigm
called wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing where the SC
platform deploys a mobile base station (BS), e.g., robotics,
drones or vehicles to assist the data collection. Moreover, the
mobile BS serves as the infrastructure for communication and
wireless power transfer.
To ensure a successful and stable operation of the crowd-
sourcing system, designing an incentive mechanism that stim-
ulates workers’ participation and efficiently allocates tasks is
essential [7]. A number of studies have proposed mechanisms
satisfying various requirements, such as profitability, strate-
gyproofness, i.e., truthfulness, and individual rationality [8].
Nevertheless, in wireless powered crowdsourcing networks,
the reward offered by the SC platform to workers is the
wireless power supply which is the major difference with
those existing mechanisms, the incentive of which is based
on monetary reward1. The difference introduces a few major
issues for incentive mechanism design in wireless powered
crowdsourcing networks, and the following questions have to
be answered. First, what is the optimal total charging power
supply from the SC platform for maximizing its utility? The
SC platform can encourage workers to transmit sensed data at
a higher transmission rate, i.e., more collected data per unit
time, but it is at the cost of a higher power supply. Second,
how to allocate the tasks and charging power to workers which
are spatially distributed in the task area? The allocation is
based on not only each worker’s sensing cost, but also the
working location which clearly affects the communication cost
and transferred power. Note that the workers’ sensing cost
and working location can be private information and unknown
to the SC platform. Lastly, how to deploy the mobile BS
1The monetary reward can be tokens, virtual money, reputation, etc.978-1-5386-8099-5/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
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taking the worker’s strategic behavior into account? Since the
worker’s working location is private, workers need to report
their own locations before the mobile BS chooses the best lo-
cation to deploy. Under the assumption of rationality, a worker
may misreport its location to increase its own utility while
reducing the SC platform’s utility. Figure 1 shows a simple
example. In the task area, there are one dishonest worker at
location LA and two honest workers respectively at LB and
LC. The SC platform should place the mobile BS at LM for
optimal utility if all workers report true locations LA, LB and
LC . However, the dishonest worker has an incentive to report
a fake location L′A, so that according to the reported locations
L′A, LB and LC, the mobile BS will be deployed at L
′
M. In
this case, the dishonest worker at LA can be closer to the
mobile BS and then enjoy more transferred power from the
mobile BS while consuming less power to transmit its sensed
data. Meanwhile, it inevitably increases other workers’ and
SC platform’s energy consumption and damages their utilities
finally. Most current studies on incentive mechanisms for the
crowdsourcing system have not addressed such issue yet. In
π(xi) π(xi) π(xi) π(xi)
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Fig. 1. An example where a dishonest worker misreports its true location.
this paper, we propose a strategyproof and energy-efficient
SC framework which jointly solves the problems of task and
wireless charging power allocation as well as the truthful
working location reporting. In the framework, there are two
phases: task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing phase.
In the task allocation phase, the SC platform determines and
announces a fixed total charging power supply. All workers
interested in participating have to choose and submit their
preferred transmission rate for the corresponding portion of
the supplied power. We use the Stackelberg game to model the
interactions between workers and the SC platform, in which
the SC platform determine each worker’s transmission rate
and allocated power. Next, in the data crowdsourcing phase,
the mobile BS requests for workers’ working locations. Based
on the Moulin’s generalization median rule [9], the mobile
BS applies the median mechanism in determining its service
location to deploy. Then, the workers start to perform sensing
tasks. We analyze the worst-case performance of the median
mechanism for maximizing the SC platform’s utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model of wireless powered spatial
crowdsourcing. Section III proposes the task and charging
power allocation mechanism. In Section IV, we present the
strategyproof mechanism for mobile BS deployment in data
crowdsourcing phase. In Section V, we provide the experi-
mental results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL: WIRELESS POWERED SPATIAL
CROWDSOURCING MARKET
The wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing system in-
cludes the requesters, the SC platform residing in the cloud
and the workers with mobile sensing devices2. Initially, the
requesters publish spatial tasks with requirements, such as
the target task area, the task period and the sensed data
type. Then, the SC platform advertises the task information
to registered workers on behalf of the requesters and collects
the crowdsourced data. As shown in Fig. 2, we denote by
N = {1, . . . , N} the set of workers and denote by At the task
area on a Cartesian coordinate plane. The worker i’s working
location Li is described by a 2-tuple, i.e., Li∈N = (xi, yi).
We use LM = (xM, yM) ∈ At ⊆ R2 to represent the deployed
mobile BS’s service location projected on the XY-plane and
use h to denote its height. In the task area, worker i has its
own working area Ai and its working location Li falls in this
area, i.e., Li ∈ Ai ⊆ At ⊆ R2.
Mobile BS
Worker 1
L2Li
Worker i Worker 2
L1
Power transfer
Data transmission
MBS service location 
LM: (xM, yM)
Li: (xi, yi)
Working location 
Task area At
Working area Ai
LM
Fig. 2. Data transmission and power transfer in the data crowdsourcing phase.
A. Power cost model
1) Worker’s power cost: We consider an FDD system
where sufficient channels are available to ensure interference-
free transmission. Moreover, we assume that the communi-
cation channels are dominated by line-of-sight (LoS) links.
Given the mobile BS’s service point LM, we can write the
worker i’s transmission rate according to Shannon’s formula
as follows:
ri = Blog2
(
1 +
P ti δ
σ2dαi
)
= Blog2
(
1 +
P ti g
dαi
)
(1)
where g = δσ2 is the channel gain to noise ratio (CNR),
δ represents the corresponding channel power gain at the
reference distance of 1 meter, σ2 is the noise power at the
receiver mobile BS, B is the channel bandwidth in hertz, P ti
is worker i’s transmission power, and α ≥ 2 is the path-loss
exponent. In addition, we define
di = di(LM) = d((xi, yi), (xM, yM))
=
√
(xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2 (2)
2The workers can be human, unmanned vehicles or robots.
as the euclidean distance between the worker i and the mobile
BS. Note that h is the height of the mobile BS. Hereby, we
can derive the worker i’s transmission power as
P ti =
(2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi . (3)
Besides the power used to transmit data, for the worker i,
we have the power cost function of data sensing P si = biri
where bi is the energy cost per bit. Here, the power cost
of data sensing is linear to the sampling rate [10], i.e., the
transmission rate. Therefore, the worker i’s total power cost
Pi can be expressed as follows:
Pi = P
t
i + P
s
i =
(2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi + biri. (4)
2) Power cost of the mobile base station: The mobile BS
consumes energy mainly for WPT to workers. If the charging
power transferred to the worker i is P ci , the mobile BS at
the service location has to consume power P c
′
i derived as
follows [11]:
P c
′
i =
P ci d
α
i
ηΓ
= P ci d
α
i κ, (5)
where κ = 1ηΓ , 0 < η < 1 denotes the overall receiver energy
conversion efficiency, and Γ denotes the combined antenna
gain of the transmit and receive antennas at the reference
distance of 1 meter.
B. Utility function in the wireless powered spatial crowdsourc-
ing system
We evaluate the utility of the crowdsourced data based on
the transmission rate, which combines two common metrics,
i.e., the data size and timeliness. For example, the requesters
may perform the data analysis and prediction based on the real-
time crowdsourced data. Higher data transmission rate means
that the requesters can process more data during a unit time
and yield more accurate prediction results. The quality of the
crowdsourced data is equivalent to the quality of the SC task
completion. We use a logarithmic function of the total data
rate R to characterize the quality q of the SC task completion
as follows:
q(R) = a1 log(1 + a2R) = a1 log(1 + a2
∑
i∈N
ri), (6)
where R =
∑
i∈N ri, a1 and a2 are parameters. Taking the
power cost of WPT (5) into consideration, the SC platform’s
utility function can be expressed as
um = q(R˜)−
∑
i∈N
P c
′
i
= a1 log(1 + a2
∑
i∈N
ri)−
∑
i∈N
P ci d
α
i κ. (7)
Similarly, we obtain the worker i’s utility function as
ui = P
c
i − Pi = P ci −
(2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi − biri. (8)
C. The procedure of wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing
1) Task allocation phase: First, the SC platform announces
the task area At and a total charging power supply Pc
(Pc =
∑
j∈N P
c
j ) to assist workers in data crowdsourcing.
The charging power P ci transferred to worker i is proportional
to the worker i’s contribution (the data transmission rate) to
the SC system, i.e., P ci =
ri
RPc =
ri∑
j∈N rj
Pc. Based on the
sensing tasks and the other workers’ responses, each worker
reports the preferred data rate ri to maximize its own utility.
We assume that the workers are risk-averse, which means that
they choose to minimize the uncertainty and the possible loss
in the future. This concept can be found in the well-known
prospect theory [12]. A common example is that many people
prefer to deposit money at the bank for safe keeping and low
return instead of buying financial products with high risk of
loss. As workers have not set out to find the suitable working
place and perform the allocated task, they are exposed to the
uncertainty of working location Li and the mobile BS’s service
location LM which are only known in the next data crowd-
sourcing phase. Each worker plans for the worst case where the
mobile BS is deployed at the farthest location from it. Since
worker i knows its own working area Ai and the task area At,
it can calculate the maximum distance Di between Li and LM ,
i.e., Di = maxLM∈At,Li∈Ai di. Note that the worker i’s utility
function in (8) is monotonically decreasing with di. When
making the decision on the transmission rate ri, the worker i
sets Di as the distance away from the mobile BS. Then, the
worker cannot suffer a loss due to the uncertain distance with
the mobile BS in the data crowdsourcing phase. We denote by
r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN ) the workers’ reported transmission rate
vector. In addition, we use r−i = (r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rN )
to denote the reported transmission rate vector for all workers
except the worker i. Hereby, the worker i’s utility function in
the task allocation phase can be expressed as
u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) =
ri∑
j∈N rj
Pc − (2
ri
B − 1)
g
Dαi − biri. (9)
The SC platform’s utility in (7) is rewritten as
u¯m(Pc, r) = a1 log(1 + a2
∑
i∈N
ri)−
∑
i∈N
ri∑
j∈N rj
PcD
α
i κ.
(10)
2) Data crowdsourcing phase: Once the total charging
power supply Pc, each worker’s allocated charging power P ci
and transmission rate ri have been determined in the task
allocation phase, workers travel to the working location and
the SC platform sends out the mobile BS to serve the workers.
However, the mobile BS has to know each worker’s working
location. Then, it can decide the service location LM for
maximizing the SC platform’s utility. To make workers reveal
their private working location Li, the mobile BS organizes the
following voting process on the spot.
1) The mobile BS first broadcasts its deployment mecha-
nism, i.e, the mechanism or method to place the mobile
BS according to the locations reported by workers, to
the task area.
2) Once receiving the notification, each worker sends its
working location Li to the mobile BS.
3) Based on the collected locations and the deployment
mechanism, the service point location LM is calculated
for the mobile BS to deploy.
Let M denote the applied deployment mechanism which
takes the workers’ reported working location vector L =
(L1, . . . , Li, . . . , LM) as input and outputs the mobile BS’s
service location LM, i.e., LM = M(L). During the above vot-
ing process, a worker i may have the incentive to improve its
own utility in (8) by misreporting its true working location Li.
To make the location voting process robust and implementable,
our designed mobile BS deployment mechanism should have
the strategyproofness (truthfulness) property, which is defined
as follows:
Definition 1. (Strategyproofness) Regardless of other workers’
reported locations, a worker i cannot increase the utility
by misreporting its working location Li. Formally, given a
deployment mechanism M and a misreported location L′i, we
should have
uˆi(M((Li,L−i))) ≥ uˆi(M((L′i,L−i))) ∀L′i 6= Li (11)
where L−i is the vector containing all workers’ working
locations except the worker i’s.
III. TASK AND WIRELESS TRANSFERRED POWER
ALLOCATION MECHANISM
We utilize the Stackelberg game [13] to analyze the model
introduced in the task allocation phase (Section II-C1). Typ-
ically, there are two levels in the Stackelberg game. In the
first (upper) level, the SC platform acts as a leader which
strategizes and announces the total charging power supply Pc.
In the second (lower) level, each worker is a follower which
determines the strategy, i.e., the preferred transmission rate r,
to maximize its own utility. Mathematically, the SC platform
chooses the strategy Pc by solving the following optimization
problem:
(P1) max
Pc≥0
u¯m(Pc, r).
Meanwhile, the worker i makes the decision on its reported
ri to solve the following problem:
(P2) max
ri≥0
u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc).
The objective of the Stackelberg game is to find the Stackel-
berg Equilibrium (SE) points. We first introduce the concept
of the SE in our proposed model.
Definition 2. (Stackelberg Equilibrium) Let P˜c be a solution
for Problem P1 and r˜ be a solution for Problem P2 of the
worker i. Then, the point (P˜c, r˜) is a SE for the proposed
Stackelberg game if it satisfies the following conditions:
u¯m(P˜c, r˜) ≥ u¯m(Pc, r˜), (12)
u¯i(r˜i, r˜−i, P˜c) ≥ u¯i(ri, r˜−i, P˜c), (13)
for any (Pc, r) with Pc ≥ 0 and r  0.
In general, the first step to obtain the SE is to find the
perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE) [13] for the non-cooperative
transmission Rate Determination Game (RDG) in the second
level. Then, we can optimize the strategy of the SC platform
in the first level. Given a fixed Pc, the NE is defined as a set
of strategies rne = (rne1 , . . . , r
ne
N ) that no worker can improve
its utility by unilaterally changing its own strategy while other
workers’ strategies are kept unchanged. To analyze the NE, we
introduce the concept of concave game and the theorem about
the existence and uniqueness of NE in a concave game.
Definition 3. (Concave game [14]) A game is called concave
if each worker i chooses a strategy ri to maximize utility u¯i,
where u¯i is concave in ri.
Theorem 1. ([14]) Concave games have (possibly multiple)
Nash Equilibrium. Define N ×N matrix function H in which
Hij =
∂2u¯i
∂ri∂rj
,i, j ∈ N . Let HT denote the transpose of H. If
H+HT is strictly negative definite, then the Nash equilibrium
is unique.
Hereby, we calculate the first-order and second-order deriva-
tives of the worker i’s utility function u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) with
respect to ri as follows:
∂u¯i
∂ri
=
Pc
∑
k∈N−i rk
(
∑
j∈N rj)2
− D
α
i ln 2
B
2
ri
B − bi, (14)
∂2u¯i
∂r2i
= −
2Pc
∑
k∈N−i rk
(
∑
k∈N rk)3
− D
α
i ln
2 2
B2
2
ri
B . (15)
Since ∂
2u¯i
∂r2i
< 0, u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) is a strictly concave function
with respect to ri. Then, the non-cooperative RDG is a concave
game and the NE exists. Given any Pc > 0 and any strategy
profile r−i (
∑
j∈N−i rj > 0), the worker i’s best response
strategy γi exists and is unique. To prove the uniqueness of the
NE, we also calculate the second-order mixed partial derivative
of u¯i for i ∈ N with respect to rj∈N−i as follows:
∂2u¯i
∂r2j
=
2ri
(
∑
j∈N rj)3
Pc,
∂2u¯i
∂ri∂rj
=
ri −
∑
k∈N−i rk
(
∑
k∈N rk)3
Pc,
where ∂
2u¯i
∂r2j
≥ 0 and ∂2u¯i∂ri∂rj ≤ 0 if ri ≤
∑
k∈N−i rk, ∀i ∈
N . Then, we have the specific expression of the matrix
function H defined in Theorem 1. Furthermore, the matrix
function H + HT can be decomposed into a sum of several
N × N matrix functions: H + HT = U + V + ∑k∈NCk,
where Uij =
{
0 i 6= j
∂2u¯i
∂R2i
i = j
, Vij =
∑
k∈N
∂2u¯k
∂ri∂rj
and
Ckij =
{
0 i = k or j = k
− ∂2u¯k∂ri∂rj otherwise.
Since ∂
2u¯i
∂r2i
< 0 and
∂2u¯i
∂ri∂rj
≤ 0 if ri ≤
∑
k∈N−i rk, ∀i ∈ N , we can find
that U is strictly negative definite and V,
∑
k∈N C
k are
negative semi-definite. Thus, H+HT is proved to be strictly
negative definite which indicates the NE in the RDG is unique.
In other words, once the SC platform decides a strategy
Pc, the workers’ strategies, i.e., the transmission rates, will
be uniquely determined. We then can use the iterative best
response [15] to find the SE point P˜c in the first level, i.e.,
the optimal strategy of Pc.
IV. MOBILE BS DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM IN DATA
CROWDSOURCING PHASE
Given the calculated SE points (P˜c, r˜) from the task allo-
cation phase, the specific problems for the SC platform and
workers in the data crowdsourcing phase are as follows,
max
LM∈At
uˆm(LM) = a1 log(1 + a2
∑
i∈N
r˜i)−
∑
i∈N
r˜i∑
j∈N r˜j
P˜cd
α
i κ, (16)
max
LM∈At
uˆi(LM) =
r˜i∑
j∈N r˜j
P˜c − (2
r˜i
B − 1)
g
dαi − bir˜i, (17)
where di = di(LM) is defined in (2). To address the mobile
BS’s location problem introduced in Section II-C2, we first
introduce an important concept of 2-dimensional single-peaked
preference for the discussed problem.
Definition 4. (2-dimensional single-peaked preference [16])
Let LM be the set of possible mobile BS’s service locations
output by the deployment mechanism M on the XY-plane
where X and Y are respectively a one-dimensional axis.
A worker i’s preference for the mobile BS’s location is 2-
dimensional single-peaked with respect to (X,Y ) if 1) there
is a single most-preferred location outcome L˜Mi ∈ LM, and 2)
for any two outcomes L′M, L
′′
M ∈ LM, L′M i L′′M whenever
L′′M <ρ L
′
M <ρ L˜
M
i or L˜
M
i <ρ L
′
M <ρ L
′′
M for ∀ρ ∈ {X,Y },
i.e., both X and Y axes.
In the above definition, L′M i L′′M straightforwardly means
L′M is preferred by worker i to L
′′
M. “<ρ” is a strict ordering
by worker i on the dimension ρ. An intuitive explanation of
this condition is that L′M is preferred by worker i to L
′′
M as
long as L′M is nearer to its most-preferred location L˜
M
i on
each dimension.
Proposition 1. In the data crowdsourcing phase, the worker’s
preference for the mobile BS’s service location is 2-
dimensional single-peaked.
Proof: We first expand the worker i’s utility func-
tion given in (17) as uˆi(LM) = uˆi(xM, yM) =
− (2
r˜i
B −1)
g
(
(xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2
)α
2 + r˜i∑
j∈N r˜j
P˜c −
bir˜i. It is clear that uˆi is concave with respect to (xM, yM)
and there is a unique optimal solution L˜Mi = (xi, yi) to
maximizing the utility. In other words, the worker i’s most
preferred mobile BS’s service location is its working location,
i.e., L˜Mi = Li = (xi, yi), which satisfies the first condition in
Definition 4. In the task area At, we randomly choose two lo-
cations L′M = (x
′
M, y
′
M) and L
′′
M = (x
′′
M, y
′′
M) ∈ At. Note that
the concavity of uˆi guarantees the concavity on one dimension
if fixing the variable on the other dimension. L′′M <X L
′
M <X
L˜Mi implies that uˆi((x
′′
M, y)) < uˆi((x
′
M, y)) < uˆi((xi, y)) for
any y on Y axis and then|x′M − xi| < |x′′M − xi|. We can have
the similar implication from L′′M <Y L
′
M <Y L˜
M
i . If L
′′
M <X
L′M <X L˜Mi and L
′′
M <Y L
′
M <Y L˜
M
i are both satisfied, we
can have (xi−x′M)2 + (yi− y′M)2 < (xi−x′′M)2 + (yi− y′′M)2
and thus uˆi(L′′M) = uˆi((x
′′
M, y
′′
M)) < uˆi(L
′
M) = uˆi((x
′
M, y
′
M)).
Therefore, the worker i prefers L′M to L
′′
M, i.e., L
′
M i L′′M,
which proves the second condition in Definition 4 and com-
pletes the proof.
Theorem 2. (Moulin’s one-dimensional generalized median
mechanism [9]) A mechanismM for single-peaked preferences
in a one-dimensional space is strategyproof and anonymous
if and only if there exist N + 1 constants τ1, . . . , τN+1 ∈
R ∪ (−∞,+∞) such that:
M(LM) = median(L˜M1 , . . . , L˜
M
N , τ1, . . . , τN+1) (18)
where LM = {L˜M1 , . . . , L˜MN} is the set of workers’ most-
preferred mobile BS’s locations and median is the median
function. An outcome rule M is anonymous, if for any permu-
tation T ′ of T , we have M(T ′) = M(T ) for all T .
Theorem 3. (Multi-dimensional generalized median mecha-
nism [16]) A mechanism for multi-dimensional single-peaked
preferences in a multi-dimensional space is strategyproof and
anonymous if and only if it is an m-dimensional generalized
median mechanism, which straightforwardly applies the one-
dimensional generalized median mechanism on each of the m
dimensions.
Algorithm 1 MED mechanism
Input: Workers’ reported locations L = (L1, . . . , Li, . . . , LN ).
Output: Mobile BS’s service point location LM = (xM , yM ).
1: begin
2: Respectively sort the workers’ locations on x-axis x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and
y-axis y = (y1, . . . , yN ) in ascending order.
3: if N is odd then
4: xM ← xN+1
2
, yM ← yN+1
2
5: else
6: xM ←
xN
2
+xN
2
+1
2 , yM ←
yN
2
+yN
2
+1
2
7: end if
8: end
A straightforward mechanism is the median mechanism [9],
[16], as shown in Algorithm 1. We simply name it as MED
mechanism MMED. This algorithm directly computes the
median of workers’ reported locations as the mobile BS’s
service point location. Apparently, it is a special case of
the multi-dimensional generalized median mechanism, so it is
strategyproof. We next analyze its performance by comparing
it with the optimal mechanism MOPT which achieves the
maximum utility of the SC platform without considering
incentive constraints. Let r˜max, r˜min respectively denote the
maximum and the minimum transmission rate among workers,
i.e., r˜max = max(r˜), r˜min = min(r˜) .
Proposition 2. The worst-case performance of the MED
mechanism MMED for maximizing the SC platform’s utility
can guarantee uˆm(MMED(L)) ≥ ϕ − 2α2N α2−1 r˜maxr˜min (ϕ −
uˆm(MOPT(L))), where ϕ = a1 log(1 + a2
∑
i∈N r˜i).
Proof: We expand the SC platform’s utility function
in (16) as follows:
uˆm((xM, yM)) = ϕ−
P˜cκ∑
j∈N r˜j
∑
i∈N
(
r˜
2
α
i (xi − xM )2 + (yi − yM )2 + h2
)α
2
, (19)
where ϕ = a1 log(1 + a2
∑
i∈N r˜i). Let xmed, x and
ymed, y respectively denote the median and mean of
x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and y = (y1, . . . , yN ). Also, we use
(xopt, yopt) to denote the optimal solution to maximiz-
ing the expression in (19), i.e., MOPT(L) = (xopt, yopt).
We also note that the optimal solution to minimizing the∑
i∈N r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2
)
is (x∗, y∗) where
x∗ =
∑
i∈N r˜
2
α
i xi∑
i∈N r˜
2
α
i
and y∗ =
∑
i∈N r˜
2
α
i yi∑
i∈N r˜
2
α
i
. As r˜min ≤ r˜i, we
have
r˜
2
α
min
∑
i∈N
(
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + h2
)
≤
∑
i∈N
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
)
. (20)
According to [17, Theorem 4.3], we have
∑
i∈N (xi −
xmed)
2 ≤ 2∑i∈N (xi − x)2 and ∑i∈N (yi − ymed)2 ≤
2
∑
i∈N (yi − y)2. Then, it is not hard to verify that
r˜
2
α
min
∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)
≤ 2r˜ 2αmin
∑
i∈N
(
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + h2
)
, (21)
r˜min
(∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
))α2
≤ 2α2 r˜min
(∑
i∈N
(
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + h2
))α2
≤ 2α2 r˜min
(∑
i∈N
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
))α2
≤ 2α2
(∑
i∈N
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
))α2
. (22)
Since α ≥ 2, we can prove that
r˜min
∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)α
2
≤ r˜min
(∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
))α2
.
(23)
Hence, based on Theorem 1 in [18] and the facts that r˜i ≤
r˜max and α2 ≥ 1, we can obtain
2
α
2
(∑
i∈N
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
))α2
≤ 2α2
(∑
i∈N
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
))α2
≤ 2α2 r˜max
(∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
))α2
≤ 2α2N α2−1r˜max
∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
)α
2 .
(24)
Combining the above inequalities, we have
ϕ− P˜cκ∑
j∈N r˜j
∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)α
2
≥ ϕ−
(
P˜cκ∑
j∈N r˜j
2
α
2N
α
2−1 r˜max
r˜min∑
i∈N
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
)α
2
)
. (25)
Finally, we can conclude that uˆm(MMED(L)) ≥ ϕ −
2
α
2N
α
2−1 r˜max
r˜min
(ϕ− uˆm(MOPT(L))).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we conduct simulations based on realistic
data to evaluate the performance of our proposed frame-
work and strategyproof deployment mechanisms. Unless oth-
erwise stated, the simulation configuration is set as fol-
lows. We consider a [0, 50] × [0, 50] square-meter area as
the SC task area At. The number of registered workers
is set as N = 50. We generate worker i’s working lo-
cation from the bivariate uniform distribution, i.e., Pu ={
1 (x, y) ∈ A = [25− βi, 25 + βi]2
0 otherwise.
, where βi ∈ R is uni-
formly distributed in [0, 25]. Hereby, the maximum distance Di
can naturally be calculated. We set the height of the mobile
BS h = 5 m, the channel gain to noise ratio g = 90 dB, the
bandwidth of each subchannel B = 60 MHz, the data utility
parameters a1 = 1000 and a2 = 200, the energy conversion
efficiency η = 0.5, the antenna gain Γ = −30 dB, and the
path-loss exponent α = 2. The sensing energy cost per bit bi is
generated from the uniform distribution on [10−4, 1.5×10−4].
Each measurement is averaged over 100 instances. Figure 3
demonstrates the impact of the number of workers on the SC
platform’s utility, the average worker’s utility and the number
of employed workers in the task allocation phase. When the
number of registered workers increases, the SC platform’s util-
ity and the number of employed workers gradually increase but
with a diminishing return. These results reflect that when more
workers are employed, the SC platform has to consume more
charging power for the same marginal utility. By contrast, the
4.60
4.65
SC
 p
la
tfo
rm
ut
ilit
y
×103
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Nu
m
be
r o
f
em
pl
oy
ed
 w
or
ke
rs
×101
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of workers
0.5
1.0
1.5
Av
er
ag
e 
wo
rk
er
ut
ilit
y
×10 6
Fig. 3. Impact of the number of workers on the SC platform’s utility (top),
the number of employed workers (middle) and the average worker’s utility
(bottom) in the task allocation phase.
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Fig. 4. The SC platform utility achieved per different mechanism with
varied number of employed workers and varied path-loss exponent in the
data crowdsourcing phase.
average worker’s utility decreases with the increase of regis-
tered workers because of the more fierce competition among
workers. Figure 4 illustrates the performance gap between the
MED mechanism and the optimal mechanism in the average
case. We use the relative difference metric which is defined
as the ratio of the SC platform’s utility difference achieved
from the OPT mechanism and the MED mechanism over the
SC platform’s utility achieved from the OPT mechanism, i.e.,
uˆm(MOPT(L))−uˆm(MMED(L))
uˆm(MOPT(L))
. When the radio environment gets
worse (a larger α), we can see the decreasing performance of
the MED mechanism compared to the optimal mechanism.
However, if more workers participate, the performance of the
MED mechanism is closer to the optimal results. This is
mainly due to the fact that the generated workers’ locations
follows a similar symmetric uniform distribution.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a wireless powered spatial
crowdsourcing framework composed of two phases. We have
proven that the proposed Stackelberg game based incentive
mechanism can help the SC platform efficiently allocate the
tasks and the wireless charging power in the task allocation
phase. For the deployment of the mobile BS in the data crowd-
sourcing phase, we have adopted the median mechanism as
the strategyproof mobile BS deployment mechanism. Besides
avoiding the dishonest worker’s manipulation, the proposed SC
framework can efficiently allocate tasks and charging power
which is shown by experimental results.
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